Ukraine, EU and Russia: soft power versus Realpolitik? by Barata, Pedro
 
OBSERVARE 
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa 
 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 5, n.º 1 (May-October 2014), pp. 31-47  
 
 
 
UKRAINE, EU AND RUSSIA: SOFT POWER VERSUS REALPOLITIK? 
 
 
  
Pedro Barata 
silva.barata@marinha.pt 
Lieutenant commander (Portugal), Officer of the Portuguese Navy,  
Commander of the hydrographic ship N.R.P. D. Carlos I,  
Master’s Degree in Peace and War Studies in New International Relations 
. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine began in 1998 with the 
signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Afterwards, in 2003 Ukraine joined 
the European Neighbourhood Policy and in 2004 EU was already the major trade partner 
with Ukraine, bigger than Russia. Anticipating the approach of former soviet republics 
towards Euro Atlantic structures and the foreseen loss of influence in its near abroad, Putin’s 
Russia launched in 2011 the Eurasian Economic Union, an economic bloc formed by some of 
the Russia’s former satellite States - Belarus and Kazakhstan – and through a carrot and 
stick policy tried to attract also Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in order to thwart the Chinese 
economic development and to impose itself in the regional and global markets.  In 
November 2013, during the 3rd EU’s Eastern Partnership Summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania, 
Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovych surprised the world refusing to sign the Commercial 
Agreement with EU, turning back to a EU possible integration.  On the other hand, Russia 
offered to reduce the natural gas rates plus a fifteen billion dollars loan, throwing Ukraine in 
a quasi civil war, and leaving EU and Russia on opposite sides. Considering this situation 
what to expect from Ukraine? To continue being a Russian satellite or head towards the Euro 
Atlantic geopolitical space?  
This paper intents to analyse the actual situation in Ukraine following Barry Buzan’s 
approach of multidimensional security, focusing on the different postures assumed by each 
one of the actors - EU and Russia - which have been between complementarity and division. 
The scope of the analysis is to contribute to the academic debate about security dynamics 
between EU, Russia and Ukraine during the post-USSR period, arguing that in the 
geopolitical dispute for the post-soviet space where Ukraine is integrated, the Russian 
Realpolitik prevails the EU soft power. 
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Introduction  
After its Independence in 1991, Ukraine, a natural Russian ally, chose to adopt a 
foreign policy favouring the West. The signature of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement in 1998 with the EU formalized Ukraine’s approach towards the EU shared 
values, and underlined EU’s strategy to promote the region’s stabilization and the 
security of its economical, commercial, and most of all, energetic projects (Barata, 
2013: 158). Thus, Russia saw its near abroad shrink; in a clear threat to the 
maintenance of its heartland and contributing to high tension relationship between the 
parts involved (Feire, 2011: 92). Post-USSR Russia tries at all cost to maintain the 
region’s domination because it allows them to gain strategic depth and to access deep-
water ports1
In this new organization of the international system, the internationalization of the 
capital flows and of the national economies reached its plenitude
. 
2, and new threats 
beside military ones arose changing security approach to a broader multidimensional 
concept, peculiar of The Copenhagen School3
This paper aims to analyse EU, Russia and Ukraine relationship, considering Barry 
Buzan’s multidimensional approach, observing the different postures they have been 
assuming, complementarity and division. The author argues that actual situation in 
Ukraine is due to the geopolitical dispute between EU’s soft power and Russia’s 
Realpolitik in its near abroad. Therefore, the following question will be answered: in 
which way will Russia and EU’s actions in Ukraine shape the regional security 
dynamics? 
 led by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 
where non military threats such as political, economical, environmental and societal are 
considered. 
                                                        
1  Georgia and Ukraine’s independence confined Russia’s access to Novorossiysk port in the Black Sea. 
Besides that, the best ports are in Georgia - Batumi, Poti and Ochamchire and in Ukraine - Odessa and 
Sevastopol.  
2  In North America we have assisted to the appearance of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) led by United States of America; in Europe, unified Germany links East and West; in the Pacific 
Japan’s centralizes a huge influence area (Office of the United States Trade Representative, S/D). 
3  According to Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in The Evolution of International Security Studies, The 
Copenhagen School analyses threats and the objects of security, specially societal security, with particular 
attention to the regional level, focusing on securitization, i.e., in the social oriented process through which 
groups of people build something as a threat, increasing the security objects and therefore extending the 
security agenda (Buzan, B., Hansen, L., 2009: 36).  
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The paper is structured in the following parts: the first one analyses the situation in 
Ukraine since its Independence, focusing on its political and economical situation. The 
second part analyses EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, main goals and how it could 
be an option to Ukraine. After that, the opposing Russian project of establishing a 
Eurasian Economic Union will be analysed and how Moscow is trying to attract Ukraine 
towards this project. Finally, EU and Russia’s relationship will be scrutinised in order to 
see if they can trigger or not stabilization to the current situation in Ukraine. 
 
1. USSR breakup: Quo Vadis Ukraine? 
The period after Ukraine’s Independence in August 1991 brought the Ukraine identity 
assertion and the expectations of building a State model based on fundamental robust 
state institutions, on a market economy, far from the soviet model - i.e. legal power 
independence towards executive and judiciary power – on promoting the rule of law, 
freedom of press, free elections, and this way approaching the Western values heading 
to a sustainable development (Lutsevych, 2013: 2). However, reality showed to be 
slightly different, a real threat to political4
Between 1991 and 1994 Ukraine was ruled by the semi-authoritarian regime of Leonid 
Kravchuk, a highly structured power hierarchy, meaning a Russian alike planned 
economy which led to a 50 % fall of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wilson, 2013: 
1), triggering new elections in 1994 and Leonid Kushma’s election, who led Ukraine 
until 2004. Kushma’s ten years of governance meant the emerging of elites - 
government and opposition – and a clan based with economic and financial power 
oligarquic political system, sometimes possibly connected to organized crime, capable 
of influencing the Ukrainian policies, and hampering structural reforms implementation 
towards development (Matuszak, 2012: 13)
, economical and energetic security:  
5. The year of 2004 brought some changes, 
as the troubled period after the allegedly fraudulent elections showed clearly that 
people wanted to change and to participate in Ukraine’s future, in what was known as 
the “Orange Revolution”. The elections opposed the Pro West6 Kushma’s ex-prime 
Minister Viktor Yushchenko to the Pro Russia (and supported by) Viktor Yanukovych. 
The Revolution turned out to be less effective to reforms implement (Freire, 2008: 3). 
Yushchenko won, named Yulia Timoshenko as Prime-minister and opposing the Pro-
Kremlin orientation the European option was still present in the Ukrainian foreign 
policy, in a bipolar Janus7
                                                        
4  Barry Buzan considers that political threats are a constant threat to the State, and the most difficult to 
identify – such as different ideologies competition or Nation attacks – although Buzan distinguishes 
between intentional, provoked political threats from the ones that arise structurally on result of external 
alternatives to States freedom (Buzan, 1991: 120). 
 posture, hard to conciliate and achieve between one Ukraine 
facing East and another facing West, and very often these postures provoked tensions. 
Yushchenko’s governance meant political instability and power struggling between the 
5  An example is Rinat Akhmetov, known as the richest main n Ukraine and main financial supporter of 
Viktor Yanukovych’s regime was till know a member of the Ukrainian parliament, in 2014 his businesses 
assured about e 31%  of the Ukrainian state businesses and controls about 50 parliament member, with 
the privileges one can imagine. Another example is the natural gas magnate Dmitry Firtash, who with the 
Vice-Prime Minister heads the “Firtash Group” which includes about 30 parliament members (Lutsevych, 
2014). Finally, Yanukovych’s son, Oleksander Yanukovych, during his father’s presidency between 2010 
and 2013 assured about 50% of all Ukrainian state contracts. In 2007 his fortune was estimated in 24 
million dollars, and in November 2013 about 770 million dollars (Grey, 2014). 
6  Although not turning back Moscow. 
7  Roman God of doors and windows, beginnings and endings, represented by two faces looking to opposite 
directions. 
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political elites8, and Tymoshenko’s government fell in 2006, triggering new parliament 
elections, won by the Yushchenko-Yanukovych coalition, and the latter, for the rejoicing 
of Vladimir Putin, was appointed Prime-minister9
The arrival of the global financial crisis to Ukraine in 2008 provoked a 14.8%
. In 2007 after Yushchenko’s call to 
new elections as a response to Yanukovych’s attempt to diminish Prime-minister’s 
powers and to resign Yushchenko, Ukraine fell in a new political crisis and Tymoshenko 
was re-elected. 
10 fall of 
the Ukrainian GDP to the already weak Ukrainian economy, which was followed in the 
first three months by a 49% decrease on the exports and increase of the 
unemployment rate to values above 9% (Wilson, 2013: 8). Compounded with the 
economical situation, Tymoshenko’s return to the government didn’t mean political 
stability, and using statements like “The Ukrainian awake for the people and not for the 
politicians”11
The pressures that Moscow applied to Ukraine, namely increasing the gas rates and 
stopping pumping natural gas, putting into risk the Ukrainian economic and energy 
security
 or “Ukrainian course towards the integration on the Euro Atlantic 
structures is not an alternative to the building of relations with the Russian Federation” 
in its foreign policy did not contributed to improve relations between Ukraine and 
Russia  (Ukraine Government Portal, 2014). 
12
Besides economic and political issues, the identity of the populations is another factor 
that must be considered when analysing the security framework in Ukraine.  Facing the 
political instability situation, and taking into account the historical legacy, the 
independence processes were used by the nationalists to highlight ethnic and social 
differences and to hamper state building and the definition of new borders (Simão, 
2011: 44). We talk about threats to societal security, which Barry Buzan defined as 
threats to society identity – traditions, costumes, religions, language (Buzan et al 
 paved the way to the end of Yushchenko’s presidency, and in February 2010 
Yanukovych was elected Ukraine’s new President, in a new turning West of Ukraine. 
                                                        
8  When in 2008 Tymoshenko returned to the government and directed the state funding to her party 
supporters   BYuT - Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, leaving out some of the enterprises belonging the Party of 
Regions oligarchs. Therefore part of the Party of Regions with financial connections to Rinat Akhmetov, 
had to politically negotiate with the BYuT in order to assure the access to some of that funds. As a result, 
in 2008 some of that negotiations were initiated, with a coalition between the two parties, the revision of 
the Constitution and some changes in the political system which included the appointment of the 
President after the approval of the Parliament (Matuszac, 2012: 33).  
9  “Putin congratulates Yushenko on ending stalemate”. Disponível em: 
http://morigin.rferl.org/a/1070390.html, accessed in February, 7th 2014. 
10 World Bank in  http://data.wo1rldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/UA?display=graph 
accessed on February, 7th 2014 
11 "Ukrainian breakthrough: for People, but not for Politicians" Available in 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=106080712&cat_id=244315174. Accessed on 
February, 7th 2014 
12   Economic security of a State stands for the possibility to access to material, financial resources, as well as 
to different markets in order to ensure economic growth capable of financing state activities, and 
therefore it’s population well being (Buzan, 1991: 445). Retarding development and budgeting financial 
dependence on foreign institutions like International Monetary Fund or World Bank may equal the 
incapability to provide basic well being needs to the populations (Ibid:446). Although energy doesn’t 
appear in Barry Buzan’s security approach it is a common issue to all the levels and dimensions - military, 
political, economic, societal – and therefore it’s important to refer to it. Energy represents to States its 
guaranty to economic and sustainable vitality, and therefore, to its development allowing the States to 
use it as a political instrument. To this matter let us remember Barry Buzan’s and Ole Weaver’s words in 
“Region and Powers: the Structure of International Security “The main prize in the geopolitics of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus is control of the transportation of oil and gas. For some is about energy, for others 
mostly about the economic implications, to others again it is mainly a way to gain influence and/or 
preventing others from doing so” (Buzan,B., Weaver, O., 2003: 422). 
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1991: 433). On the other hand, and quoting Svante Cornell, this ethnicity has a 
political component, that the author classifies as “ethnicity politicization”, i.e., 
communities don’t accept, even reveal some hostility in being ruled by people from 
another ethnicity, and this feeling as in its base the fear from consequences that might 
occur, so, triggering nationalisms and adding instability to the region which easily can 
pour out borders and become a global threat (Cornell, 2011: 40-41). As an example 
one can observe the on going crisis in Ukraine and what happened with Crimea, which 
ended with a military intervention by Russian military forces as an excuse to defend the 
Russian population, as Russia did in 2008 vis-à-vis the Georgian autonomous republics 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The result is well known; a referendum was voted on 
March 16th 2014 by allegedly 96% of its inhabitants deciding to be integrated in Russia, 
before the fumbled look of the international community13
 
. 
2. EU, Ukraine, and the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy 
The relationship between Ukraine and the EU was determined by the signature of the 
Eastern Partnership (ENP) in 199814 (EUR-Lex, 2014), whose objective was the political 
dialogue, the development of commercial and economical relationship, and the 
implementation of  state reforms. To Ukraine, ENP means cooperation with the 
European institutions, the liberalization of the economy towards a market economy, 
stimulating foreign investment and a sustainable development15
EU looks eastwards as an area of opportunity to reinforce its economical and energetic 
securities, and implementing its politics of “softpower” tries to continue the cooperation 
at political, economical and secure levels, towards good administration, market 
economy and sustainable development. And, as a matter of fact, there are good 
reasons to do it. According to the European Commission, in 2012, EU represented the 
largest commercial partner to Ukraine – 33.7% of total imports and exports, followed 
by Russia with 21.6% (EC, 2013: 9). Regarding to the commercial flow inside the ENP, 
Ukraine was also the largest commercial partner to EU 58% of exports, followed by 
Belarus with 21% and 44% imports, next Azerbaijan with 39% (Eurostat, 2013). 
. Besides, Ukraine was 
the first of the fifteen  NIS  of the former URSS  to increment such a partnership, in 
2003 embraced the  ENP and from 2004 onwards, EU was already  Ukraine’s  largest 
comercial partner, including Russia (Freire, 2008: 17). The importante question is: will 
Ukraine  be as  relevant to the EU as the other states included in the  ENP? Or it’s 
historical legacy, the proximity with Russia and the security concerns, particularly 
energetic, make this country a prime actor in the EU’s ENP? The answer is: Yes, 
Ukraine is a different partner. It is located in the main routes between Europe and Asia, 
it has frontiers with EU States but also NATO‘s – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Romania - consequently, strategically Ukraine is an important actor in EU’s security 
architecture. 
                                                        
13  In Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA1Q1E820140316, 
accessed on April, 3rd 2014. 
14 Council and Commission Decision of 26 January 1998 on the conclusion of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and Ukraine, of the other part Disponível em: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31998D0149, accessed on April 4th 2014. 
15  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Their member states, and 
Ukraine. Available in 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=659 
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Concerning energy security, it’s important to consider that the disintegration of the 
USSR brought to the political and economical international agenda the dispute for the 
energy resources, particularly natural gas and crude oil, adding a new chapter to what 
had once been referred to as “The Great Game”16 - the control of Eurasia (Barata, 
2013: 18). EU has only  2% of the world’s natural gas energetic reserves17, depending 
on oil imports for as much as 53.8% and 60.8% of that is relative to natural gas.  
According to the “Statistical Pocketbook 2012”, if the tendency keeps up as from 1990, 
the level of dependency of oil imports in the EU will continue to grow18
Russia exports to the EU, through Ukraine about 80% of its natural gas (Freire, 2008: 
25). Natural gas delivery cuts to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 imposed by Russia for 
allegedly failing to comply to the financial compromises, and in an effort to increase the 
involvement of Gazprom in the Ukrainian Naftohaz, with unwanted implications in some 
European States, such as happened in Germany, is a clear evidence of the EU’s security 
vulnerability, as well as the politicization
. 
19 of energy by Russia, that considers its great 
energetic income a way to guarantee its economical and political stability20. This 
existing energetic interdependence between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia 
and the EU has contributed to the energy securitization21
In March 2003, in the scope of the enlargement of the EU to twenty five, ENP was 
enforced (European Union Extended action Service, 2014), consolidating a new 
framework for the relations between the enlarged EU and the neighbouring Eastern 
countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine) and to the 
South (Algeria, Palestine Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Syria and Tunisia), allowing a degree  of economical integration and a deeper political 
relationship. Russia, though being a EU neighbour, is not part of the ENP countries
, adding additional 
uncertainties to that tripartite relation. 
22
                                                        
16  The term “Great Game” is linked to Arthur Conolly. British Army Officer, used this term to describe the 
dispute between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for the Central Asia in the beginning of the 
XIXth Century (907). The term was first written in one of the two volumes he wrote about his military 
campaigns called – Journey to the North of India. Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and 
Afghanistan (British Empire, 2014). 
, 
17  In 1997 223.2 tons of Oil Equivalent were pumped representing about 12% of world reserves. The major 
part of these reserves are in Netherlands and Great Britain (European Commission GREEN PAPER - 
Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, 2000: 18). 
18  In accordance with EU’s report, since 2000 oil imports (in TOE) were the following: 532.76 in 2000, 
600,37 in 2005 and 560,98 in 2010. Concerning natural gas the figures are the following: 192.53 in 2000, 
257.29 in 2005 and 275,53 in 2010 (Statistical Pocketbook, 2012: 115). 
19  An issue that is publically known and thus needs a governamental decision (Khrushcheva, 2011: 217). 
20  Later in 2009, Tymoshenko renegotiated the possible agreement with Russia which Ukraine was obliged to 
import per year about 52 billion cubic meters, and Russia would pay a small fee by the fact of using the 
Ukrainian pipelines (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012). Ukraine pays one of the highest natural gas prices - 400 
dollars for 1000 cubic meters, when, for instance Belarus pays 160 dollars (Ibid). 
21  The term securitization was introduced by the Copenhagen School and is based on the speech-act. It 
assumes that exists a threat, an agent and a security object, and can be observed as the way a state (or 
agent) socially, builds up publicly an existing (or not) threat to its security which forces an immediate 
action beyond daily and routine political measures (Buzan, et al,1998: 23-24). 
22  In accordance with the Russian Vice-Prime-minister in 2004 Vladimir Chizhov: ”this [the ENP] is an 
attempt to reduce to the least common denominator groups of countries and individual states that are 
entirely different in their level of development and that, in addition to this, have different objectives with 
respect to the EU itself – objectives that are oftentimes incompatible with one another., “Russia is a large 
self-sufficient country with its own views on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In contrast to some 
smaller Eastern European or South Caucasus countries striving for EU-membership Russia is neither a 
subject nor an object of the European Neighbourhood Policy”. That is to say that Russia felt offended 
when was compared with other minor states like, for example Moldova or Morocco, and insisted that the 
bilateral relations between them should take into account the equal treatment between the two regions 
towards the strategic partnership (Haukkala, 2009: 2-3). 
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and its relations belong in the framework of a Strategic Partnership23
ENP allowed these new partners to participate in various EU activities, through the 
cooperation at a political level, in security and also in economic and cultural events. The 
objectives of that policy are evidente in the Plans of Action and in the European 
Neighbourhood Accords established with each one of the neighbours, political 
documents  that  define  the strategic objectives of the cooperation between neighbour 
countries and the EU and which contain a global list of priorities established in common 
grounds by each of the countries and the EU. 
 (Ministerio das 
Finanças, 2010). 
In 2009, during the Prague Summit, EU launched the initiative of Eastern Partnership24 
aiming to support Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine with 
their transition reforms and consolidation of democracy, promoting the gradual 
integration of the economy and concomitantly activating the citizens mobility, the 
political association and encouraging cooperation. This initiative is based on the 
principle "more for more – more support for more progress", and advocates as values 
the respect for human rights, the Rule of Law, democracy and the compromise to 
implement a market economy (European Council, 2013)25
In December 2012 EU defined as pre-requisites for the acceptance of the Agreement of 
Association with Ukraine, the implement of structural reforms, free elections according 
to the patterns of the West and the Independence of the three powers of the state:  
legislative, executive and judiciary. It was equally made clear that the fulfilment of this 
conditions gets Ukraine closer to a future possible integration, but does not imply, per 
se, full admission as a member of the European Union, (External Action Service, 
2014c)
. 
26. It does mean the politic of the three M’s money, markets and mobility, and 
more resources when Ukraine needs more and better State, although without a promise 
of integration - membership. However this type of cooperation with Ukraine is seen by 
Russia as a threat to its regional interests, for an eventual integration  of some of the 
participating States in the Euro-Atlantic structures - as in the case of Ukraine or 
Georgia – would remove them from its sphere of influence, which is understood by 
Russia as a clear strategy of  seclusion27
From EU’s point of view, its politic of softpower has a goal, to keep active its politic of 
neighbourhood, fundamental instrument for the European security architecture- in 
every dimension – in order to stay as an actor in the region.  The remoteness of the 
Ukraine, the instability encroached in the Southern Caucasus, and the slowdown of 
reforms in Moldavia, deflate the influence of the EU in the region, strengthening the 
influence of Putin’s Russia (Osica, 2013: 47). 
. 
                                                        
23 “The EU has a coherent European Neighbourhood Policy to direct relations with its eastern and southern 
neighbours. A Strategic Partnership based on four Common Spaces is the framework for relations with 
Russia, which is not part of the ENP.”(European Commission, 2014). 
24  The Eastern Partnership (EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (2014b) 
25“ Cimeira da Parceria Oriental prepara assinatura de acordos de associação”, Available in:  
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/eastern-partnership-summit-prepares-
signing-of-association-agreements?lang=en,  accessed on February 13th 2014. 
26 Council Conclusions on Ukraine. Available in: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf 
27 Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that Rússia without Ukraine is a Nation-State but with Ukraine is an Empire. 
Charles Tannok in “Ukraine’s path not taken” (2013). Available in: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/charles-tannock-asks-why-ukraine-has-rejected-the-eu-and-considers-what-
the-west-should-do-about-it#irTD40WiS0MjFLIw.99, accessed on April. 5th 2014. 
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On the 3rd Summit of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius effected in 28-29th November 
2013 the EU aimed to review the process of integration of some of its partners in the 
Association Agreements and in the Deep and Comprehension Free Trade Agreement28 
among them Georgia and Moldavian though maintaining the negotiations with Ukraine 
present on the table29. For that it was important to analyse if the pre-requisites defined 
in December 2012 had been complied, for they constitute condition sine qua non for 
the signing of the EU agreements. Facing the possibility of a postponement of the 
Commercial Agreement by Yanukovych one week before the beginning of the Vilnius 
Summit, the pro-Western voices initially pacific descended to the streets in Kiev 
attempting to press the Ukrainian President to rethink his decision and sign the 
agreement. However though shaken – Prime-minister Mykola Azarov resigned – 
Yanukovych resisted aligned with Russia and prays for this decision to guarantee a 
victory in the next presidential elections 2015 
After two months of conflicts mainly centred in the capital, Kiev, and dozens of deaths, 
President Yanukovych and the opposition decided to negotiate a truce. At the moment 
the agreement mediated by EU’s German and Polish Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
involved the formation of a government of national unity and the return to the 2004 
Constitution; the reformulation of the powers of the President, Government and 
Parliaments; the summoning of presidential elections after the enforcement of the 2004 
Constitution - never before December 2014 – the proceedings of an investigation to the 
acts of violence conducted by a team formed by the authorities, the opposition and the 
European Council; restraining violence by Ukrainian authorities and the opposition and, 
at last, the deliverance of every illegal weapons to the Minister of Internal Affairs 
(Sarna, A., Wierzbowska-Miazga, A., 
2013). 
In this triangle of relationship EU-Ukraine-Russia Ukraine lives internally pressed to 
take a decision about the line of integration that should be followed in a model, which is 
political and economically incompatible. Ethnical and political diversity
(BBC, 
2014). 
30
 
 present 
between Russians (about 17.3%) pro-Eurasian Union, and Ukrainians (about 77.8%) 
pro-EU sets a challenge, which transcends economical and energy questions but should 
not be impeditive to achieve a cooperative solution to both ways – East and West. 
 
                                                        
28  This agreement is included in the European neighbourhood Policy and aims to enlarge commercial 
relations with some partner states on a holistic approach and allow an integration of South Caucasus in 
the EU  markets – facilitate  customs mechanisms, decrease transaction taxes, among other measures 
(European Commission, 2012). Azerbaijan was out of this initiative once it doesn’t belong to the World 
Trade Organization, a condition imposed by the EU to integrate DFCTA. 
29  Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan announced on September 3rd 2013 that integrating Eurasian Union 
was the option, what was considered by EU incompatible with the signature of the Association 
Agreements (European External Action Service, 2014d). In fact this position can be understood, Russia is 
its main economic trade partner and its security shield. Since May 1992 that Armenia member of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization of CIS and since August 1997 that is linked to Russia through the 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance – which foresees a Russian intervention in case 
of any attack to Armenia (Tamrazian, 2012). Referring to Azerbaijan, The ENP Vilnius Summit in 
November 2013 meant the signature of the facilitation visa agreement and EU underline that will pursuit 
towards the signature of the Association Agreements with Azerbaijan after its admission to the World 
trade Organization (Council of the European Union, 2013). 
30  Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Available in: 
http://ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/about_ukraine/population/ukr/179.html, accessed on April, 8th 2014. 
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3. The Eurasian Economic Union: towards Russian hegemony 
In October 2011 during the presidential campaign, the yet Prime-minister Vladimir 
Putin proposed to create an economic bloc which would allow the regional integration of 
its member states, paving the way towards leadership in the global markets. To this 
bloc, based on the previous experiences acquired with the Community of Independent 
States (CIS), with the Eurasian Economic Community and with the Custom Union 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, Putin called the Eurasian Economic Union. 
With this policy Russia intends to maintain control over the regional markets as well as 
to build a strong position in a region where its influence never ended. This build up has 
been possible through a close relationship with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and using 
Realpolitik31 of carrot and stick policy with Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In Belarus case 
approach began in 1997 through the Russia-Belarus Union – Union of States32 after the 
year 2000. However, the fact that it doesn’t have natural resources available to feed its 
industry, and therefore be dependent on Russian financing33, leaving few alternatives 
to react to a possible Russian economy retraction, allowing its foreign policy to be 
controlled by Russia (Voloshin, 2012). Kyrgyzstan’s case is different. Its energy 
reserves and strategic position linking Europe and Asia – right in the middle of 
Mackinder’s Heartland34
Ukraine is a concern to Russia vis-à-vis Eurasian Economic Union’s success. Its bipolar 
posture, divided between integrating Euro Atlantic structures and maintaining its 
linkage with Russia raises concerns to regional hegemony ambition from Moscow’s 
government. In first place because since early ages of Empress Catherine II that 
Ukraine has an important Russian naval base in the Crimea Peninsula - Sevastopol – 
which allows Moscow to maintain its presence in the Black Sea and its southern borders 
security. This importance was clear when in 2010 Russia and Ukraine announced that 
they were negotiating renewal of the leasing contract signed in 1997 and which would 
expire in 2017. The main goal was to extend the contract for more twenty five years, 
until 2042, and on the other hand Ukraine’s natural gas rates would be reduced to 30% 
of the market value, as Ukraine assumed to increase annually its gas imports from 
2011 and ahead to 40 million cubic meters
 – allows Russia to promote its economic interests with the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as to ensure its southern borders security. 
What about Ukraine? 
35
                                                        
31  Realpolitik it’s a term that was coined in the XIXth century, revisited by Henry Kissinger in the XXth century 
and expresses the policy and diplomacy of the states based on power and practical aspects instead of 
moral, ethical and ideological aspects.  
 (Martins, V., Conde, P., 2010).  
Maintaining Sevastopol’s leasing Russia intended to block any aspiration towards a 
NATO membership, once NATO would not accept to have a member in the Alliance, 
which integrates, in its territory a Russian military base with the Black Sea Fleet. This 
issue was definitely solved (think so) when in last February 2014, on conclusion of 
three months of riots centred in Kiev pro-EU protesters and security forces, under the 
banner of Russian population protection, Russian troops entered Crimea and in a few 
32  Available in: http://mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/, accessed in April, 4th 2014. 
33  In Putin promised a 4 million dollars loan to the Belarusian government paving its economical dependence 
(Voloshin, 2012). 
34  Halford Mackinder argued in The Geopolitical Pivot of History that heartland, where Eurasian continental 
masses meet is the fulcrum of all major geopolitical transformations that occurred in the World’s Big 
Island. This geographic uniqueness gives political advantage; therefore, the one who rules the heartland 
would rule the World’s Big Island, and the planet (Mackinder, 1904). 
35  More than in 2009 and in 2010 (Chow, 2010). 
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days took control of government buildings, military bases and airports, and on March, 
24th 2014 integrated Crimea in Russia. Secondly, because the Ukrainian energy market 
represents 46 million of potential consumers, and because Ukraine stands in most of 
the energy routes to Europe, as for historical reasons Poland and the Baltic States are 
out of the question regarding energy transportation36
Ukraine’s integration in the Eurasian Economic Union represents a one third reduction 
on natural gas rates, which will be reviewed by Moscow (i.e. Gazprom) each four 
months, and a 15 billion dollars loan to be paid in three years (Reuters, 2014). This 
means that when the West waves with money for reforms, Russia offers money 
expecting subduing and to endure a strong dependence (Sherr, 2013: 4). 
 (Voloshin, 2012). Finally, it is 
important to underline that Russia is an Ukraine’s economic partner: in 2012 
represented about 26% of total exports and 33% of total imports (World Trade 
Organization, 2013), inside CIS Ukraine represents 38% of foreign Russian investment, 
and this geo-economics space represents 40% of total Ukrainian exports, therefore it 
shouldn’t be wise to be hostile towards Ukraine (Fânzeres, 2013). 
 
4. UE-Rússia: division or ou complementarity? 
Nowadays we assist to EU and Russia rivalry, and it is possible that this rivalry will 
increase in the following years, endangering twenty years of partnership existing since 
199437
On one hand, because Russia will continue to influence Ukrainian political elites in order 
to keep away a possible Euro Atlantic structures membership, risking possible sanctions 
as a retaliation to some politics that would endanger its influence in its near abroad. 
The rest, Prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev made it clear to Mycola Azarov – Ukrainian 
Prime-minister - in the beginning of November 2013 that the chances to sign the 
Association Agreement with EU were null, because, otherwise Ukraine will have to begin 
paying in advance its natural gas supply. Besides that, Russia will demand the payment 
of all existing debts at the moment, and therefore, would be better to start financing its 
energy needs with the EU (Havlik, 2013). On the other hand, because Ukraine has a 
strong economic dependence on Russia, and besides that, Crimea’s integration in 
Russia at the eyes of a disbelieving international community clearly, clearly showing 
power, deteriorated the already tense relations between EU and Ukraine. Meanwhile 
Putin acts in accordance to Colin Gray’s statement
, despising 500 million possible consumers market, and making believe that in 
the near future division will place complementarity, shaping regional’s security 
architecture. 
                                                        
36  Poland’s territory suffered from Russia (with Prussia and Austria) three divisions during the XVIIIth 
Century (1772, 1793 e 1795). Later, in September 1939, at the beginning of World War Two, Russia 
invaded Poland again (Cienciala, 2004). Referring to the Baltic States, few states know Russia better, 
once during hundreds of years they were part of the Russian Empire, and subdued by the Soviet Union for 
50 years (Economist, 2014). 
: "the exercise of continuous 
influence or control requires the physical presence of armed people in the area at issue" 
37  In was initiated the Cooperation Partnership Agreement (1994 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA)). 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 5, n.º 1 (May-October 2014), pp. 31-47   
Ukraine, EU and Russia: soft power versus realpolitik? 
Pedro Barata 
 41 
 
(Kaplan, 2013: 33)38, the international community, in particular the West answers with 
economic and diplomatic sanctions, which, at the moment, don’t seem to be effective39
What can one expect from EU, turning back or proceed in order to achieve its strategic 
interests? 
.   
The decision would be to reinforce its presence in the East, and for that should ensure 
international financing to the in charge Ukrainian government, showing that it opposes 
to Russian politicization of the natural gas prices. At the same time EU should rethink 
its policies concerning democracy development, rule of law and security in order to 
achieve a stable and secure neighbourhood which will allow to, together with its 
partners, collect benefits from this common space (Dempsey, 2014). For that, time is 
on its side, and that was perfectly clear in Herman Van Rompuy’s, President of the 
European Council, statement at the Security Conference last 1st of February in Munich: 
"Our biggest carrot is our way of life; our biggest stick: a closed door". (Conselho 
Europeu, 2014). For the EU will be important to maintain Ukraine’s Association 
Agreement signature as a strategic goal which will allow the access to new markets 
where 46 million of consumers stand40, as well as access to new resources, in particular 
energy ones, and a key geographic position towards Central Asia and Middle East. 
Therefore EU should look forward to be next to Ukraine, instead of trying to get 
answers to the reason why Ukraine didn’t sign the agreement last November during the 
Vilnius Summit. The summit showed that EU should rethink its strategy towards the 
Eastern Partnership, including Russia, and promoting cooperation in areas such as 
trade and mobility 
 
(Popescu, 2014: 4). 
Conclusions 
Ukrainian’s President decision of not signing the Association Agreement with the EU 
during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius brought up the fragilities of Kiev’s 
regime, and at the same time, showed Putin’s intention to project power to the region 
maintaining the Russian influence on a geopolitical space that was always considered 
its near abroad. 
Last February, 20th
For Ukraine, government instability, deficient social policies, fragile and highly 
dependency on Russia economy, corruption indexes, and elite politicization - 
government and opposition – have been provoking divisions in the society, which have 
been spreading all over the eastern parts of Ukraine, specially in the regions with 
bigger Russian expression, such as Donetsk, Luhansk and, Karkhiv, showing the 
 2014 the signature of an agreement between Yanukovych, at the 
time the Ukrainian President, and the Ukrainian opposition brought to an end months of 
demonstrations and conflict, specially in Kiev, that arose in late November 2013. The 
completion of one and every point of the agreement, in particular those referring to the 
presidential elections will mark an important moment on Ukraine’s future and on its 
relations either with Europe and Russia. 
                                                        
38  Colin S.Gray in Robert D. Kaplan “The Revenge of Geography”. 
39  As a response to the economic sanctions Putin’s Russia (GAZPROM) answered with a pike on the natural 
gas rates. During the week of 31st of March to 6th of April natural gas rates increased 40% (Reuters, 
2014b). 
40  In accordance with the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, available in: 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/, accessed in 6th of April 2014. 
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presence of non-military threats, such as political, economic, societal and energy 
threats. 
Competition between EU and Russia for the post-soviet space where Ukraine lies has 
been shaping security dynamics in the region in its several dimensions, in what is 
already considered as The New Cold War after Perestroika. For EU, Ukraine, 
strategically located in the major trade and energy routes to Central Asia, is an 
important economic partner and constitutes a key player in EU’s security architecture. 
However, EU’s soft power has been quite ineffective. In face of the entrance of 
thousands of Russian militaries in Crimea, occupying governmental buildings, military 
bases and airports, EU in particular (the international community in general) answered 
with diplomacy and economic sanctions to Putin’s Russia. 
Russia is and it will continue to be an important economic partner to Ukraine, specially 
concerning energy security. Though it is probable that Russia will continue to pressure 
Ukraine to increase its flux trades eastwards in order to get lower gas rates, if not be 
prepared to suffer consequences - economic blockades or energy cuts – one should not 
neglect EU’s pressures waving with more for more. As a way to block the Euro Atlantic 
intentions eastward, Russia promoted the Eurasian Economic Union, in a clear intention 
to expedite trade relations and free circulation and markets with its neighbours, in a 
quasi-empire trade policy of carrot and stick where each one of the participating States 
only approves the decisions already taken by Moscow. However it is paramount to this 
project that Russia be able to keep Ukraine on its influence sphere in order to definitely 
avoid an Ukrainian turning towards Europe, which will mean the regional game over to 
Russia in a clear threat to its interests in its preferential space of influence. Eurasian 
Economic Union implementation will allow Russia to aspire regional hegemony, twenty 
years after the falling of the Soviet Empire and will do everything to achieve it. Till this 
moment, Russian Realpolitik has been directed to energy securitization, but one should 
not neglect military securitization as well. 
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